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ERODING THE WNTERSRIGHT: NON-INDIAN
WATER USERS' ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE SCOPE

OF THE INDIAN SUPERIOR ENTITLEMENT TO
WESTERN WATER TO PREVENT TRIBES FROM
WATER BROKERING*
KAREN CRASS'

INTRODUCTION
In the western states, access to water is power. Indian tribes currently are entitled to enough water to tie up all the unallocated water
of the west.' Transfer of Indian water rights for on or off-reservation
uses, such as mining and natural resources development, could put
tribes in a position of "brokering" much of the nation's western water
supply.2 States and non-Indian water users are concerned that the legal possibility exists that large quantities of water will be consumptively
used or leased by Indians to the exclusion of junior appropriators in
the state appropriations system.3 Yet, there exists an immediate market
* This paper was the winner of the Colorado Bar Association's 1997 Natural Resource Section Student Writing Competition.
* A 1997 graduate of the University of Denver College of Law, Karen Crass currently lives in Washington, D.C. and works with the Native American Rights Fund.
1. Telephone interview with Craig Bell, Executive Director, Western States Water
Resources Council regarding new study of western water management (unpublished
report) (Feb. 6, 1997).
2. Indian water rights may well exceed seventy-five percent of the flows in the Missouri River. Hearings on Transfer of Reclamation Facilities Before the Water and Power Subcommittee of the House Committee on Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-90 (1995) (testimony of Susan M. Williams, Counsel for Mni-Sose Intertribal Water Rights Coalition);
"There is enough irrigable land on the Ute Reservation to dry up all of the non-Indian
irrigation on the Mancos Valley." Hearings on Energy and Water Appropriations Before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development of the Committee on Appropriations, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 635-37 (1994) (testimony of Fred V. Kroeger); The Winters claims of
the Navajo nation alone could arguably dry up the San Juan River Basin. Telephone
Interview with Mr. John Leeper, Navajo Department of Water Resources (Feb. 13,
1997).
3. In the 1980s, there was a large demand for Missouri River water for coal slurry
pipelines. At one time the tribes were offered $3.6 million for 20,000 acre feet annually. States efforts to prevent unregulated tribal water marketing is based on the fear
tribes will "sell to the highest bidder." Since tribal water rights are not subject to the
state system, states are also concerned about the "harm" that will come to downstream
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for tribal water both on and off reservation. However, tribes have yet
to receive the congressional authorization necessary to allow them to
capitalize on this opportunity for economic development through leasing their entitlement to water, despite the fact that tribes have the full
legal right pursuant to the Winters doctrine to utilize their water entitlement in any way the tribe chooses. 5
Tribes' superior right to water is threatened. History has shown
that tribes cannot always rely on the government or the courts to protect vested rights to tribal property or natural resources, especially
when those rights affect the economic development of the country.
States are attempting to limit tribal water rights by casting doubt on
the actual intent behind the Winters right and by asking courts to limit
the scope of the entitlement when making water allocation decisions.
The Wyoming Big Horn cases, the most recent full adjudication of
tribal water rights, provide a good example of the fact that courts may
be willing to ignore principles of tribal sovereignty, the Supremacy
Clause, canons of treaty construction, the Winters doctrine, and case
precedents to limit tribal water interests in favor of non-Indian water
users in the western states, where access to water is the key to economic development and growth.
users when Indians start taking their share. Hearings on HR 5098 Before House of Representatives Natural Resources Oversight Investigations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Congressman Pat Williams).
4. Water-short states are beginning to admit that paying for unused tribal water is
sometimes the only way to obtain enough water for growing municipalities. States like
California and Nevada are fast approaching limitations allocated by Congress in the
1929 settlement agreement allocating water of the Colorado River among states. Such
states are currently investigating leasing water from tribes. Telephone Interview with
Sammy Maynes, Attorney for the Southern Ute Tribe (Mar. 19, 1997).
5. The long-standing rule has been that tribes could decide how to use their water
entitlement. The Big Horn III case, discussed below, upset this precedent. In re The
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All
Other Sources, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
6. Joseph R. Membrino, Indian Reserved Water Rights, Federalism and the Trust Responsibility, 27 LAND & WATERL. REv. 1, 12 (1992). Membrino notes that the turn of
the 20th century was marked by massive expropriation of Indian lands and the turn of
the 21st century is the era when the Indian tribes risk the same fate for their water resources.
7. The adjudication of all the water rights in the Big Horn River system consisted
of a series of three cases and fifteen years of litigation: In re The General Adjudication
of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other Sources, 753
P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) ("Big Horn I") (involving Indian reserved water rights for the
Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation); In re
The General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 803 P.2d 61 (Wyo. 1990) ("Big Horn II") (dealing with claims
of non-Indian successors to allotments on the Wind River reservation); and In re The
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All
Other Sources, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) ("Big Horn III") (regarding the regulation
and administration of the reserved rights awarded in Big Horn 1). The Big Horn III decision is most germane to this paper-erosion of the Winters right. In Big Horn III, the
Wyoming Supreme Court held that tribes could not determine for themselves new
uses of their quantified water rights and that a change of use was subject to state regulation. Big Horn III provides an example of state courts protecting state water rights at
the expense of tribes and in so doing threatens tribes that seek quantification of water
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This article maintains that tribes should assert their full entitlement to water throughout the West while the law remains in their favor. If exercised properly, tribal reserved water rights could mean political power and economic gain for Indians and provide a last chance
for them to maintain authority and control of a valuable resource to
which they have vested title.8 Private, natural resources developers
would find access to substantial Indian water rights attractive and
would be willing to pay a premium price for securing the rights necessary to implement complex resource development projects.'

WINTERS RIGHTS
Indian reserved water rights are federally created under Winters v.
United States,"° in which the Supreme Court held that Indian water
rights were impliedly reserved for the benefit of the Indians at the time
of the reservation's creation in sufficient quantity to fulfill the purpose
of the reservation." Over the next sixty years, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the reserved rights doctrine to include nonIndian federal lands. Arizona v. California, ("Arizona I"),12 while dealing
rights in court by casting a cloud of uncertainty over the previously secure Winters
right.
8. During the 19th century, Indian and non-Indian controversies revolved around
land-related issues. In this century, water issues are of fundamental importance to
tribes. Tribal governments are asserting their rights to water to protect their futures.
Steven J. Shupe, Indian Tribes In The Water MarketingArena, INDIAN WATER 1 (1989).
9. The primary fear regarding Indian entitlement to western water is that private
industry could afford to purchase superior and substantial quantities of water for developing natural resources and generating electrical power apart from the States'
regulatory systems. The concern is that municipalities will have difficulty obtaining
adequate water supplies if forced to bid for tribal water against private natural resources developers. Telephone Interview with Attorney Tom Schipp (Mar. 18, 1997).
Also significant is the fact that contract renewal for major power generating plants are
now subject to § 107 review of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §107 (1973),
which can become complex and expensive, making obtaining tribal water an attractive
alternative to compliance with the Endangered Species Act requirements. Telephone
Interview with Sammy Maynes, Attorney for the Southern Ute Tribe (Mar. 19, 1997).
10. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). Winters and other non-Indian
settlers sought to dam the Milk River upstream of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation. The United States argued on behalf of the Indians that Winter's actions interfered with irrigating reservation lands. The Supreme Court held that, although the
treaty establishing the reservation was silent on the matter, it had impliedly reserved a
sufficient quantity of water for the Indians to irrigate their land. Establishing the priority date at the time the reservation was created effectively granted tribes a reserved
right superior to most non-Indian interests that were established pursuant to the state
system. There are a few tribes that claim aboriginal water rights, and, when upheld,
these rights displace Winters rights in priority. The claims to entitlement differ in that
the Winters right is based upon a grant of water from the United States to tribes and
the aboriginal title is a right reserved by tribes, predating and existing apart from the
Winters right. Jessica Bacal, The Shadow of Lone Wolf Native Americans Confront Risks of
Quantificationof Their Reserved Water Rights, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 1, 21 (1991).
11. Id.
12. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The case began as a dispute among
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primarily with non-Indian federal lands, proved significant for three
reasons, because it reaffirmed the Court's earlier interpretation of the
Winters right, quantified it as "enough to irrigate all the practicably irrigable acreage on the reservations" and, most importantly, implied
that the right was expandable as it was
4 "intended to satisfy the present
and future needs of the reservation.'
In making a determination of reserved water rights, courts must
first consider the purposes of the reservation and then reserve
enough water for fulfilling those intended purposes. The real battle
between the tribes, non-Indian users, and states revolves around this
determination of the "purposes" of reservations. Since each reservation was the result of a separate negotiation, courts must evaluate each
treaty separately in making these decisions, and the canons of treaty
construction mandate that
courts make these conclusions in a light
7
most favorable to tribes.
several western states over each state's share of the waters of the Colorado River. Exercising its trust responsibility, the United States intervened on behalf of the five Indian tribes having claims to the waters of the Colorado River. The Court upheld the
Winters doctrine, reaffirming that Congress intended to reserve enough water to satisfy
the future as well as the present needs of the Indian Reservations-enough to irrigate
all practicably irrigable acres. The Court rejected the state's arguments that the measure should be made according to the number of Indians living on the reservation, stating that estimating future Indian populations and needs would be wholly speculative.
13. The Arizona Court established the "practicably irrigable acreage" standard
("PIA') used to quantify the Indian water right. PIA is calculated by first measuring
the arable land on the reservation and determining if the land is irrigable from a
purely engineering standpoint. Then the currently available technology is assessed to
determine if the land could be farmed. Finally, the economic feasibility of the process
is assessed. If the annual benefits exceed costs, the land is considered practicably irrigable. In adopting the PIA standard, the Court explicitly rejected Arizona's proposal
that it adopt a "reasonably foreseeable needs" standard which would have been based
upon the number of Indians living on the reservation. Arizona, 373 U.S. 546, 599. The
PIA standard was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Wyoming v. United States, 488
U.S. 1040 (1989).
14. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 599. For full discussioi of the controversy surrounding the
practicality of the PIA standard, see Martha C. Franks, The Uses Of The PracticablyIrrigable Acreage Standard In The Quantificationof Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RESOURCESJ.
549, (1991).
15. Arizona, 373 U.S. at 594. While the purpose of the reservation varied over time,
the pervasive and persistent theme in Indian policy has been the development of economic viability of the reservation. Jessica Bacal, supra note 10, at 21.
16. Each treaty is examined in the context of the situation at the time it was established in an effort to establish the intent of the parties at the time. These are crucial
decisions because the court's determination of "purpose" is directly related to the size
of the tribe's entitlement. See Arizona, 373 U.S. at 594. States are attempting to limit
tribal water uses by asking courts to hold that allocations of water pursuant to the Winters doctrine may only be used on the reservation and only for those uses that fulfill the
"purposes of the reservation." But, see, Big Horn III, 835 P.2d 273 (court holding tribes
could not convert their agricultural water to instream flow because instream flow
could not have been contemplated by the treaty establishing the reservation).
17. Canons of treaty construction govern the interpretation of Indian treaties state:
First, ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the Indians; second, Indian treaties must
be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them; and third, Indian treaties
must be construed liberally in favor of the Indians. STEVEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF
INDIANS AND TRIBES, THE BAsic ACLU GUIDE TO INDIAN AND TRIBAL RIGHTS (2d ed.1992)
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Narrowly interpreted, use of reserved water would be limited to the
boundaries of the reservation,'" but this could limit tribes to an agrarian lifestyle on reservation land much of which is not suitable for agriculture.' On the other hand, broadly interpreted, Indian entitlement
means enough water to fulfill the economic development of the tribe, °
including any use that could promote progress and economic development. Since most treaties contain language suggesting the United
States intended reservations to become a permanent homeland for
tribes and that tribes should become self-sufficient, the door is left
open for courts to allocate water for all uses that promote economic
development of tribes. Opponents of such broad interpretation argue it is too open-ended-that Congress could not possibly have envisioned such an expansive right.23 Others believe that limiting reserved
water use to the reservation is equivalent to preventing tribes from using its entitlement at all.24 Forcing tribes to rely on completion of federally funded water delivery systems in order to put their water entitlement to use means non-Indian users continue to utilize water that
belongs to the tribes.
The uncertainty of the Winters right is incompatible with the westwhich governs water allocation in
ern doctrine of prior appropriations
21
most of the western states. In the prior appropriations system the application of water to a beneficial use perfects the right, sets its priority
date and quantifies its amount. 26 A user's right can be lost through
at 40.
18. Big Horn , 753 P.2d at 119 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
19. Wyoming's argument in attempting to limit the scope of the Winters right in Big
Horn III, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992).
20. Broad interpretation includes all uses of water required for a "permanent
homeland." United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1410 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1015 (1983). This interpretation is consistent with Indian policy that supports tribal autonomy and self-sufficiency of Indian tribes.
21. District Judge Hanscum would allow other uses including the sale of water off
the reservation where the activity contributed to the progress and development of the
Indian homeland. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d 273 (Hanscum,J., dissenting).
22. This line of reasoning was used in United States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp.
187 (W.D.Wash. 1980). Here the court found an intent to "civilize" the tribe and determined that fishing was crucial to meeting the needs of the tribe. A broad interpretation of the treaty gave Indians a superior right to take a greater share of the fish at
the expense of non-Indian commercial fishermen. See Eric Eisenstadt, Fish Out of Water: Setting a Single Standardfor Allocation of Treaty Resources 17 AM. INDIAN L. REv., 209
(1992).
23. Supra note 19.
24. Membrino, supra note 6, at 28. Membrino and others argue that tribes are
forced to forego the full entitlement of their water rights when they are not allowed to
utilize their water off-reservation. When limited to on-reservation use only, tribes must
wait for federal water delivery projects which often are promised but never delivered
or delivered many years after the fact, resulting in foregone profits for tribes on water
that is rightfully theirs.
25. A prior appropriation is granted when a person applies a particular quantity of
water to a beneficial use, and those rights continue so long as the beneficial use is
maintained. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAw, WEST NUTSHELL SERIES 97-104 (2d ed.
1990).
26. Id. at 97.
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nonuse or abandonment. 27 Pursuant to Winters, a right to water exists
with the date of the establishment of the reservation as its priority date
and continues to exist regardless of whether it is presently being used
or not, meaning it is generally superior to those non-Indians who set-

tled and obtained their water rights through the state allocation system
after most reservations were established. The effect of Winters in the
West is that non-Indian water entitlements remain subject to future assertion of a superior Indian reserved right. Because the Winters right
exists apart from the state system and because the right can be asserted
by tribes at any time, the Winters right usurps the predictability of the
"first in time, first in right" notion of western water use. Where an unquantified Indian entitlement remains, the amount of water to which
tribes have a legal right remains questionable. The state system of allocating unappropriated water is forced to operate under the uncertainty of these "uncalculated" quantities without knowing when, if ever,
they will be put to use. In the meantime, the risk is high for nonIndian investment in water development that may be discontinued
once a tribe decides to assert its right to its water entitlement. When
the tribal water right is quantified, the state can better calculate how
much of the river remains available for allocation to new or different
beneficial uses.29

EROSION OF THE WINTERS DOCTRINE
The Winters Doctrine is being attacked by states and non-Indian
water users. Water-short western states are attempting to protect water
rights of non-Indian users by asking courts to limit the scope of the
right: (1) by advocating that courts should balance the Indian entitlement with that of the non-Indian user; (2) by placing limits on the
right" by being "sensitive" to the surrounding water rights which will
be impacted; and (3) by attacking the feasibility of proposed tribal water uses to diminish the amount of the entitlement." The fact that
27. Id. at 90.
28.

Winters, 207

U.S. at 564.

29. As long as tribal claims to western rivers remain unquantified, states will con-

tinue to overappropriate the rivers. The result is that water-short states continue to
use for free the water tribes have a legal claim to and from which tribes receive no
benefit. For example, California's uses are expected to go beyond 5.2 maf for 1996,
exceeding its 4.4 maf per year entitlement to the Colorado River by some 800,000 acre-

feet. California is able to get that water largely because of the Indian entitlement that
goes unused-but at no cost to California and with no benefit to the tribes. Secretary
of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, Address at the ColoradoRiver Water Users Association (Dec.

19, 1996) (on file with author).
30.

For example, bills have been introduced in the Congress that would stipulate a

short period of years in which tribes must exercise their reserved rights and insisting
that water use outside the reservation be subject to state regulation. Susan D. Brienza,
Wet Water vs. PaperRights: Indian and Non-Indian Negotiated Settlements and Their Effects,
11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 151 (1992).

31.

In Reynolds v. Lewis, 545 P.2d 1014, 1015 (1976), the district court rejected the
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courts are entertaining these types of arguments aimed toward restricting the Winters right poses huge risks to tribes which have not yet
quantified their reserved rights."
In Big Horn III, the State of Wyoming unsuccessfully argued that
the Winters doctrine is a mere court "fiction" in an effort to convince
the court that the doctrine was not a universal right of entitlement to
water for all Indians and that the doctrine should not be applied
equally to all reservations. Wyoming asserted Congress had different
ideas in mind when the Wind River Reservation was established and
the legislative history of the reservation suggests Congress intended it
should obtain its water rights through the state appropriation system,
and, therefore, the Winters entitlement was not applicable. 4
Opponents also argue that federal reserved water rights should be
determined with "sensitivity" to the surrounding water rights which will
be impacted, a balancing that would have the effect of minimizing reserved rights to a "minimum amount possible to support reservation
purposes." States rely on the following three Supreme Court cases to
support the "sensitivity" argument: Cappaert v. United States;5 United
States v. New Mexico; 6 and Washington v. Washington State CommercialPassengerFishingVessel Association.7
States quote the Cappaert statement that the reserved rights doctrine "reserves only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more" to support the argument that tribal
reserved rights should be quantified to a "minimal need" standard."
In United States v. New Mexico, the Court carefully considered a federal
agency's asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the

land was reserved, implying that the federally reserved water right
should be applied with sensitivity to its impact on those who have obtribe's claims on the grounds that they failed to prove the economic feasibility of the
proposed irrigation projects and instead awarded the tribe a population-based award
with no award for future agriculture-contrary to the Winters promise of enough water
for future uses and despite the Supreme Court's express rejection of a "population
based" standard in Arizona I.
32. Tribes that engage in litigation of Winters claims can no longer be certain of
what standard courts will use to measure the entitlement or how broad or how narrow
the purpose of their reservations -will be interpreted by courts. Depending on the
court, tribes could win a full Winters award or they could be awarded "enough to meet
minimum needs." It should be noted that the tribes on the Wind River Reservation in
Wyoming chose not to appeal the Big Horn III decision because of these concerns. Interview with James Merrill, Attorney for the State of Wyoming in Big Horn III (Feb. 6,
1997).
33. Big Horn III, 835 P.2d at 273; Interview with James Merrill, Attorney for the
State of Wyoming in Big Horn III (Feb. 6, 1997).
34. Interview with James Merrill, supra note 33.
35. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1979) (Court considering the federal
reservation of water rights for a national monument).
36. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (involving water rights for
national forests).
37. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658 (1979) (Court applying a "need based" analysis for quantifying the measure of the Indians' entitlement to take fish both on and off the reservation).
38. Cappaert,426 U.S. 128, 141 (1976).
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tained water under state permits." In Washington, the Court required
that Indians show a "need" for the full amount requested,"0 opening
the door to arguments that the Supreme Court sanctions placing a
"need based" ceiling on the allocation of a scarce resource between
Indian and non-Indians.4'
It is important to note that none of the three cases that states use
to erode the Winters right address the issue of Indian reserved water
rights. Both Cappaertand New Mexico deal with water reserved for nonIndian, federal reservations, and the Washington case deals with allocation of fish, making practicably irrigable acreage ("PIA") inapplicable.
Therefore, tribes should argue that the PIA standard continues to govern quantification of the Winters right, pointing out that it was upheld
in the Big Horn adjudication, the most recent Supreme
Court decision
42
with respect to quantification of Indian water rights.

THE BIG HORN CASES
The Wyoming Big Horn cases are significant because they represent
a change in what had been a well established trend of courts broadly
interpreting the Winters right when determining the purpose of reservations, favoring allocating water for uses that would economically advance tribes and where the particular use plays a central and crucial
role in the life and economy of the tribes. In Big Horn I, the Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed with the Special Master's Report, accepted in part by the district court, that the Wind River Reservation
had a "homeland" purpose which typically includes agriculture. 44 The
39. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-03 (1978). The case was the first to establish the
notion that water should only be reserved for the "primary" purposes of the reservation. Water for all other "secondary" uses should be obtained through the state system
when the Court stated that "agencies administering federal reservations have recognized Congress' intent to acquire under state law any water not essential to the specific
(primary) purposes of the reservation." This dictum has been used to limit the
amount of water reserved for federal reservations and to suggest that the Supreme
Court supports a "balancing" of competing interests with regard to the implied reservation of water.
40. Washington State Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
41. This need based approach could be used to tie resource allocation to population of the reservation which would be significantly less than the PIA allocation. The
measure of the right could also be diminished by decrease in population on the reservation but the measure once quantified would not be subject to increase. This method
of measuring the reserved right cannot legally be applied to tribal reserved water
rights as it ignores the principles of the Winters doctrine which governs Indian water
rights.
42. BigHornI,753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
43. Colville Confederated Tribe v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1981) (court determining creation of reservation impliedly reserved enough water for maintaining
man-made trout lake where tribe relied upon fishing and irrigation for survival).
44. Big Horn I, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988), cert. granted in part, 488 U.S. 1040, 109 S.Ct.
863, 102 L.Ed.2d 987 cert. denied in part, 492 U.S. 926, 109 S.Ct. 3265, 106 L.Ed. 610
(1989), affirmed, Wyoming v. United States (Big Horn II) 492 U.S. 406, 109 S.Ct. 2994,
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Master applied a PIA standard, considered the tribes' proposed irrigation projects and their economic feasibility, and recommended an
award to the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Reservation totaling 477,292 acre-feet per year as well as some smaller reserved
awards for non-agricultural uses.4 ' The Wyoming Supreme Court refused the "homeland" purpose in favor of "agricultural," thereby
eliminating the Master's allocation of reserved rights for uses other
than agricultural.4 6 The court severely restricted the Winters rights by
imposing state regulation on tribal water and placing a prohibition of
the export of water off the reservation 7 Significantly, the court refused to find a reservation of water for mineral and industrial development. The overall effect was deterrence of natural resource development through elimination of large quantities of water that could be
available for mineral development projects.1 Affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court, Big Horn I essentially sanctioned a trend toward "shrinking" the Winters right, thereby placing tribes on notice that adjudica9
tion for their legal entitlement to western water was risky at best.
The Big Horn II case proved devastating to tribes when the Wyoming Supreme Court limited the Winters right further by stating that
Indians could not change their future water right without regard to
state water law.50 Limiting use in this way means tribes are not free to
reallocate water previously used for agriculture to other uses such as
instream flow or for natural resources development projects that might
prove better for tribes economically. The Big Horn III decision represents an unprecedented state intrusion on tribal sovereignty in the water arena, serving again to put tribes on notice of just how desperate
states are to prevent
Indians from gaining any control in the western
5
water market. 1
106 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). Big Horn Iwas on appeal from the district court's acceptance
of the Special Master's Report that recognized the much broader "homeland" purpose
and awarded Indians water for irrigation, stock watering, fisheries, wildlife and aesthetics, mineral and industrial, and domestic, commercial, and municipal uses.
45. Special Master's Report, (Dec. 25, 1981), Supplemental and Final Special Master's Report, (June 1, 1984) (Wyo. 1977).
46. Big Horn , 753 P.2d 76, 96 (1988). The Wyoming Supreme Court ignored the
language of the Winters Court where Winters implied that the "arts of civilization" were
among the intended purposes of the Indian reservation. Regarding what standard to
use to measure the right, the Court decided that Cappaert,New Mexico, and Washington
had implemented a "needs based" test but that these cases had not overruled the PIA
standard.
47. Id. By determining that Congress had no other purpose in mind but to convert Indians to agrarian people, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld limiting water to
on-reservation agricultural uses. No case law exists to support such limitations on use
of the quantified reserved right.
48. Some argue states are protecting sources of water for municipal use by asking
courts to limit the tribes entitlement in this way. Telephone interview with David
Getches, Professor, University of Colorado, Boulder, Co. (Apr. 3, 1997).
49. BigHorn, 492 U.S. 406, rehearingdenied, 492 U.S. 938.
50. BigHorn III, 835 P.2d 273, 282 (1992).
51. Despite the fact that tribes' Winters rights were trammeled by the Big Horn III
decision, the Wind River Indians chose not to appeal this decision to a U.S. Supreme
Court that did not appear to be any more sympathetic to their cause than the Court
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QUANTIFICATION
Today, quantification of tribal water rights is desirable for both
tribes and for states. From the tribal perspective, once reserved rights
are quantified, tribes can move toward beneficially utilizing their fair
share of the waters traversing their reservations. 52 Quantification transforms the Winters right from a "notion" of an entitlement to a contract
for a specified amount of water which tribes can use for their benefit
or as a tool for negotiation with states and other interested users.5
Once quantified, it is less likely that the U.S. government can neglect
to consider tribal allocations when considering federal water projects
for non-Indian uses. 54 For non-Indian interests, unquantified Indian
reserved rights means more water remains available for allocation by
states for new and different uses and in many instances non-Indians
continue to use the Indian entitlement for free.55
Some risks exist for tribes considering quantification: (1) tribes are
56
wary of state enthusiasm for removing the cloud of the Winters rights;
(2) quantification places limits on that ability to increase the amount

of water claimed;

and (3) once quantified, the Supreme Court held

that affirmed the Big Horn I decision. Therefore, Big Horn III does not have binding
effect on courts outside Wyoming, but that does not diminish its damaging impact on
Indian water negotiations.
52. For California alone, each year tribal water rights went unquantified meant 300
billion more gallons of water for the state. Susan D. Brienza, supra note 30, at 178.
53. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (permitting Indians to determine how to use reserved water is
consistent with the general purpose of the creation of an Indian reservation); once
quantified, tribal "paper" rights become tools for negotiating with water-short cities.
For example, California cities have been willing to pay for the tribal allocations in federal projects not yet in use. Tribes have also been allowed to trade their unused allocations in federal projects not yet deliverable to tribes for cash. Peter W. Sly, Urban and
Interstate Perspectives on Off Reservation Tribal Water Leases, 10 WTR. NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 43, 45 (1996).
54. During the major water development era in the West pursuant to the Reclamation Act of 1902, 43 U.S.C. §391, Indian entitlements to water were essentially ignored.
U.S. National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future-Final Report to the
President and Congress of the United States at 474 (1973). The result of the federal
government's failure to protect tribal water is that most rivers in the West have been
overappropriated.
55. Non-Indian ranchers and farmers rely on availability of unused tribal water for
irrigation for agriculture. Cities and municipalities surrounding reservations typically
utilize water that is actually allocated but unused by tribes. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development Committee on Appropriations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
2307-23 (1994) (statement of Ron Pettigrew, President, and Steve Harris, Secretary,
Board of Directors of Animas-La Plata Water Conservancy District).
56. Bacal, supra note 10, at 3. This urgency on the part of states to settle water
rights issues is viewed by some Indians as another attempt at usurpation by nonIndians of Indian resources.
57. Pevar, supra note 17, at 218. The Winters right allows tribes to utilize as much
water as is necessary to support the purpose of the reservation for now and into the
future. The amount of the Winters entitlement may increase over time if the needs of
the reservation increase. However, once quantified, tribes may not increase their entitlement.
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that tribes may not ask that those cases be revisited. 8
The extraordinary cost of quantification of water rights has been a
major hindrance to tribes. In the past, it made little sense for tribes to
spend the money litigating the quantification issue only to win an
award of water having little value to tribes which lacked capital to develop the right. The federal government's history of uncompleted water storage and delivery systems served as a disincentive for quantification.59 However, today, with nearly every river in the West overappropriated ° and the value of available water in the market rising,
quantification of reserved rights makes economic sense for tribes that
may61want to establish themselves as a broker in the western water market.

WATER BROKERING
Since tribes have strong legal claims to an enormous share of the
waters of the West,6 2 tribal water leasing could have a significant economic impact on non-Indian uses. 6 Indian claims to water in the West
58. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 571 (1983).
59. Fulfillment of the reserved rights of the five tribes with water interests in the
Colorado River Basin is based upon completion of the Animas-LaPlata Project which
has been delayed since its authorization in 1968. Tribes continue to wait for the federal government to fulfill a promise ratified by Congress in 1988.
60. For example, the Colorado River system is overappropriated. The Compact
apportionment was made in 1922, when only 16 years of record were available to determine the amount of annual flow-unfortunately these were relatively high flow
years. Compact negotiators believed they were dealing with an annual average supply
in excess of 17 maf. The result was an apportionment of Colorado River water totaling
16 maf, when actual average annual flow is now estimated at 15 maf or less. Hearings
on CurrentManagement Issues in the Lower Basin of the Colorado River Before The Water And
Power Subcommittee Of The Senate Energy And NaturalResources Committee, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. 15-30 (1994) (statement of Elizabeth Ann Reike, Assistant Secretary-Water Science Department of the Interior).
61. For the first time ever, in 1996, the demand for water in the Lower Basin of the
Colorado River exceeded the Basin's basic apportionment. Demand is expected to
continue to regularly exceed available unallocated water as consumption in each of
the lower basin states has been growing. These lower basin states are looking for available unused water for purchase to meet their growing needs. California is meeting
short term deficits through voluntary agreements by farmers to forego use of river water during periods of shortage. These same opportunities are available for tribes once
they know how much water is legally available to them. Secretary of the Interior,
Bruce Babbitt, supra note 29.
62. HearingsBefore Subcommittee On Water and Power Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 176 (1994) (testimony of David H. Getches that only
about one million acre-feet of the tribes' entitlement to the Colorado River had been
quantified through adjudication).
63. The Winters claims of the Navajo Nation alone could dry up most of the west.
The Navajos unquantified claims include: Little Colorado River (water negotiations
continue); San Juan River (major Navajo claims remain unadjudicated); Mainstem
Colorado River(The Navajo Nation has yet to submit a claim on the Colorado River
(mainstem) and its water rights remain unquantified); Rio San Jose and Zuni Rivers
(adjudications pending). Navajo Nation Drought Contingency Planning Study, Phase I, De-
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have enormous potential to disrupt existing uses. If just the Navajo
rights alone were ever fully adjudicated, courts could award the Navajos an estimated two million acre feet of water per year.' The mere
threat of the existence of such an enormous consumptive right interferes with full development of a state's water resources and conflicts
with huge capital investments made by non-Indians in the same water
supply. Obtaining enough available water for non-Indian uses could
pose a significant challenge. On the San Juan River alone, the major
stakeholders and those that would be impacted most are coal, natural
gas, and power generators.65
Tribes base their claims that they have the legal right to decide for
themselves how to utilize their entitlement on principles of treaty construction which indicate that Winters awards should not be restricted by
federal or state regulation unless the right is expressly abrogated by
Congress.& Congress has not abrogated tribal authority over regulation of water use, therefore, states should
have no authority over how
67
tribes utilize their water entitlement.
Clearly, tribes have the right to lease unused water rights to nonIndian users on the reservation." Courts have interpreted the general
statute authorizing Indians to lease • reservation
land to include the
69
authority to lease water on-reservation. Authorizing tribes to market
partment of Water Resources Management, Division of Natural Resources, Navajo Nation U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado Region, Grand Canyon Area Office,
(1996). The Colorado Ute Tribes agreed to forego Winters claims on many of the
streams that cross the reservations in exchange for storage in the Animas-LaPlata Project to be built by the federal government, supra note 59. Without this agreement,
tribes will be forced to assert the full Winters rights. On just the La Plata River alone,
the tribes have a decree for over 60,000 acre-feet while the annual flow of the river is
only 39,000 acre-feet per year. Tribes have refused to accept money in lieu of water as
settlement of their water rights. Litigation over these claims will bankrupt the states,
the tribes, and the federal government. Telephone Interview with Mr. John Leepers,
Navajo Department of Water Resources (Feb. 13, 1997); testimony of Fred V. Kroeger,
supra note 2.
64. Telephone Interview with Mr. John Leeper, Navajo Department of Water Resources (Feb. 13, 1997).
65. Contingency PlanningStudy, Appendix A, supra note 63.
66. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905). For full discussion of implication of treaty construction rules on Winters doctrine see Susan M. Williams, Indian
Winters Water Rights Administration:Averting New War, 11 PUB. LAND L. REv. 53 (1990).
67. Tribes argue that they have the right to utilize, manage, and control their own
water resources-including the authority to market the water to whomever they
choose. Indians assert that this is the key to tribal autonomy and self determination for
Indians in the western states. Oversight Hearing On The Lower Colorado River Before the
Subcommittee on Water and Power, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 160 (1994) (testimony of the
Honorable Daniel Eddy,Jr. Tribal Chairman of the Colorado River Indian Tribes).
68. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 48, (held "when a tribe
has a vested property right in reserved water, it may be used in any lawful manner");
but, see Big Horn III, 835 P.2d 273 (Wyo. 1992) (Wyoming Supreme Court refusing to
allow tribes to dedicate a portion of their reserved right to instream flow).
69. 25 U.S.C. §415 (1955) has been interpreted as pertaining to tribal water marketing. It expressly addresses tribal lands, giving tribes broad authority to lease their
lands with the prior approval of the Secretary of the Department of the Interior. No
court has decided whether this statute also governs leasing water separately from the
land. Id. The Department of the Interior has invoked §415 as providing congressional
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water provides opportunity for Indians to gain financial advantage
from their Winters rights without impacting the federal budget, while
providing convenient access to much needed water for more economic
resource development.7" A few tribes have bargained with states under
compacts or settlement agreements to market water outside the reservation, but most states remain opposed to tribes becoming involved in
water marketing, especially interstate.7' Since Congress allows leasing
of Indian lands for farming, mining, and oil and gas exploration it
seems only logical that leasing of water rights should also be authorized.7 By refusing to allow Indian water leasing, Congress is limiting
its availability to those who would utilize it for natural resource development projects that would benefit both Indians and non-Indians. Refusing the necessary authorization for marketing water also limits or
dictates its use contrary to western water use principles which encourage seeking the most beneficial use for water.
The issues regarding off-reservation leasing and interstate marketing involve different and separate concerns. Some non-Indian interests support allowing off-reservation leasing as long as the water cannot
be transferred out of state, and most states accept off-reservation marketing contingent upon the benefits of the ultimate water use accruing
to the state economy. However, states are much more jealous of allowing tribes to market water out-of-state where states are afforded no
regulation authority.
The federal government and the Department of the Interior favor
Indian water marketing as promoting more efficient use of western water, but no general statutory authority exists to allow all tribes to en-

consent necessary for off-reservation use of tribal water. Pursuant to §415, the Navajo
and Hopi tribes lease several thousand acre feet annually off-reservation to the
Peabody Coal Company for a. slurry pipeline. Telephone Interview with Sammy
Maynes, Attorney for the Southern Ute Tribe (Mar. 19, 1997).
70. The Carter, Reagan and Bush administrations endorsed marketing of Indian
water rights as a means to fund Indian water settlements. Peter W. Sly, supra note 53, at
44. With the days of easy money for federal water projects over and with the increasing
complexity of environmental compliance making development of new water supplies
too costly or impractical, some argue water marketing is the most feasible option for
delivering Indian water entitlement. StevenJ. Shupe, supra note 8, at 2.
71. Congress has authorized off-reservation marketing for all of the Colorado Basin
Indian settlements approved since 1982. However, authorized off-reservation marketing remains subject to state regulation. Peter W. Sly, supra note 53, at 46. Most states
were bitterly opposed to even a hint that tribes should have the power to market their
water interstate in the 1980s when most of the compacts were approved by Congress.
Since that time, some water-short western states have had a change of heart-California and Nevada currently favor authorizing tribes to market water interstate. Colorado
and Arizona, however remain opposed-fearing California and Nevada will win the
bidding war for lower basin water. Telephone Interview with Sammy Maynes, Attorney
for the Southern Ute Tribe (March 19, 1997).
72. Testimony of David Getches supra note 62; See also, Lee Herold Storey, Leasing
Indian Water Off The Reservation: A Use Consistent With The Reservation's Purpose, 76 CAUF.
L. REv. 179, 206 (1988). Storey argues that leasing of Indian reserved water rights is a
new pursuit consistent with the progress of civilization since the nation's market for
buying and selling water rights has increased over the years.
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gage in marketing unexercised reserved water rights. The Department of the Interior's policy report states that water marketing should
be a cooperative effort among federal, state, and tribal governments,4
but that "marketing initiatives have to be in accord with federal law.0
The National Water Commission recommended that the government
lease water from Indians to stabilize non-Indian water uses. Yet Congress has refused to approve settlements of Indian water rights disputes
which included even the possibility of interstate water transfers. Although some settlements have included leasing of tribal water rights
on and off reservation, the issue of whether the scope of the Winters
right includes the legal right to market a tribes' water off-reservation
remains unclear." Opponents to off-reservation leasing may acquiesce
to specific instances of marketing established by settlement agreement,
but they strongly object to admitting that the Winters right establishes
precedent for authorizing the right.

73. The Non-Intercourse Act could provide a legal barrier to Indian water marketing. The Act requires congressional approval of any "purchase, grant, lease, or other
conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation ...." 25
U.S.C. §177 (1955). The argument has been made that the Act prohibits the leasing
of Indian water rights, and that a specific act of Congress granting approval for such
leasing agreements is necessary. David Getches and others suggest that Congress is
under obligation to act pursuant to the trust responsibility owed tribes, and that water
markets are a means for tribes to realize material benefits from their rights now rather
than forcing tribes to wait for the completion of federally funded water projects. See,
Testimony of David H. Getches, supra note 62. A general statute enacted by Congress
that waives the Nonintercourse Acts for Indian water marketing would allow individual
tribes to enter off-reservation leasing agreements without express congressional approval. Congress could still delegate approval authority to the Secretary of the Interior
as is done with leases of land to non-Indians.
74. To date, all settlement agreements authorizing off-reservation leasing strictly
adhere to state regulation of interstate water transactions which shows that tribes are
willing to work cooperatively with states recognizing interstate agreements. Secretary
of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, supra note 29.
75. Joseph R.Membrino, supra note 6, at n.14; see, also Storey, supra note 72, at 214,
stating that states should realize that transferring Indian water rights in water short areas would serve both the Indians' and the other regional users' economic interest.
76. David H. Getches, supra note 62, at 4.
77. Several tribes are operating under congressionally authorized settlement
agreements. Each agreement varies slightly from the next but all have a common
thread-tribes are required to make major concessions in these settlement agreements. Telephone Interview with John Leepers, Navajo Department of Water Resources (February 13, 1997). For example, in the 1985 Compact to settle the Assiniboine and Sioux tribes' water rights in Montana, the Navajo tribe was forced to waive all
Indian water rights claims against the U.S. government and agree to protect the irrigation rights of approximately 32,500 acres of non-Indian landowners by agreeing not to
market their water entitlement from the Missouri River. The Western Area Power
Administration estimated that if the tribes marketed 50,000 acre feet out of the basin,
downstream power production would diminish by $395,009,000 to $4,000,000,000 annually. Statement of Congressman Pat Williams, supra note 3.
78. By asking courts to limit the scope of the Winters right to prohibit change of use
for off-reservation leasing, states can avoid altogether the battle over interstate marketing. If the Winters right is limited in scope to include only on-reservation use, and instate off-reservation use, the question of whether tribes may allocate their Winters entitlement to interstate marketing will no longer be an issue.
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Tribes recognize the importance of water markets. 9 Water marketing gives value to Indian water rights, ° as a means of raising capital for
long-term growth and to augment money available from the federal
budget. Water marketing is becoming increasingly important to tribes
as western economies are experiencing growth while at the same time
many western water basins are at or near full appropriation. Environmental and financial constraints are making development of new water
supplies politically unpopular, and tribes are being asked to pay the
price for increasingly stringent environmental regulations by foregoing water projects simply because their projects were last in priority for
completion.' v Therefore, facilitating water transfers is becoming increasingly appealing for meeting growing demands for water."
Indians have taken a proactive position toward developing and
protecting tribal water resources by forming partnerships of tribes having water claims in a common river basin. °° These tribes believe that
79. This is not to indicate that all Indians or all tribes are generally in favor of marketing their water. In fact, there are many tribal members who view water marketing
as a violation of their religious and cultural values. RIcKY SHEPHERD ToRREY, MARK
TILDEN, AND DWAYNE FowLEs, TRIBAL WATER MARKETING,10 n.26 (1995); Steven J.
Shupe, supra note 8, at 8.
80. By the application of water obtained by settlement agreement, the Ak-Chin
Tribe in central Arizona expanded the tribe's irrigated acreage by over 10,000 acres,
replacing governmental and social services once provided to members with services
funded from tribal income from the profitable farming enterprise and off-reservation
pumping. Reid Peyton Chambers and John E. Echohawk, Implementing The Winters
Doctrine of Indian Reserved Water Rights: ProducingIndian Water And Economic Development
Without InjuringNon-Indian Water Users? 27 GONZ. L. REv. 447, 456.
81. Since the 1970s, money for federal water projects has become increasingly difficult to obtain. The current movement opposing federal expenditures on such projects provides an example of the difficulties tribes encounter. U.S. Senator Russ
Feingold, D-Wis., along with twenty-three environmental groups released the "Green
Scissors '97 Report," February 3, 1997. The Report identifies federal programs that
members consider waste billions in tax dollars as well as damage the environment. Included in the report is an amendment proposal terminating funding for the AnimasLaPlata federal water project in Colorado, see n.59. Although the Animas-LaPlata Project would benefit Indian and non-Indian water users, the project is the last unfinished
step in meeting all the terms of the Colorado Compact Agreement which settled all
the water claims to the Colorado River of the Southern Ute Tribe and the Ute Mountain Ute Tribe. Government Press Releases, Media Advisory, February 3, 1997, available in
WESTLAW, ALLNEWS Database.
82. Supra note 29, at 7. Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt emphasized his belief that water marketing is an important tool in bringing California's long term need
to bring its demand in line with available supply. There is also a growing contingency
that believes that authorizing tribal water marketing could become a vehicle for solving constraints and impediments of the environmental regulations and difficulty in
raising money for water development for tribes-water marketing rights could be used
as a trade-off for the constraints placed on the utilization of tribal water by restrictive
environmental compliance. Telephone Interview with Stanley Pollack, Navajo Nation
Department ofJustice (Mar. 4, 1997).
83. Hearingson the Lower ColoradoRiver Before The Subcommittee On Water And Power Of
The Senate Energy And Natural Resource Committee, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., 170-75 (1994)
(testimony of George Arthur, President Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership); see,
Attachment A: Position Paperof the Ten Tribes With Water Rights In The Colorado River Basin (1994) (stating that the primary purpose of the partnership is to maximize onreservation use of tribal water, although tribes are willing to explore off-reservation use
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intrastate and interstate water marketing is consistent with the Commerce Clause,?4 and can be structured so as not to undermine compact
allocations." For example, the Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership proposed that: (1) each tribe should quantify, with the cooperation of the States, an available supply of unused tribal water; (2) tribes
and water-short states would determine among themselves how much
water, and under what terms, they would lease from the tribes; and (3)
leases would be subject to approval by the basin states, the tribal part86
nership and the Secretary of the Interior.
Non-Indian opposition to Indian water marketing is primarily
based upon the following arguments: (1) that the Winters right did not
contemplate water leasing in any form, thus reserved rights are not intended to be marketable
(2) tribes will sell to the highest bidder to
the disadvantage of existing users; 8 (3) tribal marketing disrupts already settled interstate allocations of water; 9 (4) transfer of Indian water rights should be governed by the same principles of state water law
controlling that particular region."
of tribal water).
84. Id. at 14. The Colorado River Basin Tribes Partnership stated that present discussions among the States are troubling to the tribes. "California's concept of an escrow account envisions that substantial quantities of presently unused water will be
utilized by California with compensation paid to other Basin States-much of the water California wished to use is allocated to the tribes, yet there is no provision for compensating tribes." The Partnership proposes to work cooperatively with states to provide the water California needs while compensating tribes.
85. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982). Tribes are relying on Interstate
Commerce Clause prohibitions on state control over allocation of water rights that
cross state boundaries.
86. This proposal is representative of the position most tribes take regarding the
issue of water leasing. Tribes show a willingness to work cooperatively with states to
provide water to those water-short areas within a basin, but they wish to maintain
authority to negotiate separate agreements with purchasers pursuant to principles of
tribal sovereignty and federal Indian policy of promoting tribal independence.
87. This argument rests on the belief that the Winters right should be narrowly defined to provide water for tribal use on the reservation only, and only for the original
purposes of the reservation none of which expressly mention water marketing. Joseph
R. Membrino, supra note 6. The Governor of Arizona is currently advocating a prohibition against all tribal water marketing, even on the reservation. Telephone Interview
with John Leepers, Navajo Department of Water Resources (Feb. 13, 1997).
88. An example of this is the Fort Peck Reservation in Montana. Several downstream states successfully sued to stop the ETSI pipeline which would have delivered
20,000 acre feet a year out of the Oahe Reservoir in South Dakota for slurrying coal to
the southeast. Tribes have been forced to trade these out-of-basin water marketing
opportunities in order to get Congressional approval of their negotiated settlement
agreements. Hearings on HR 5098 Before the Committee on Natural Resources Oversight and
Investigations, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Caleb Shields, Chairman Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation). These are instances
where Getches, the Navajo Tribe, and others argue the federal government has
breached its trust responsibility to tribes.
89. Many western states have implemented area-of-origin protections, restricting
transfers to the basin of origin. States with negotiated agreements allowing tribal leasing maintain these protective provisions. Torrey, Tilden & Fowles, supra note 79, at 28.
90. Out-of-basin marketing becomes extremely political. The Fort Peck Reservation Tribes in Montana calculated the price of trading their out-of-basin marketing
options as: 50,000 acre feet of the Tribe's water remaining in the Basin was worth at
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THE TRUST RESPONSIBIITY
Tribes should argue that the government violates its trust responsibility by neglecting to assist tribes in capitalizing on opportunities for
economic development through leasing their entitlement to water. 9'
This trust relationship is a result of tribal agreements ceding land to
the federal government in exchange for promises of protection and
the creation of a permanent homeland for Indians. 92 The Supreme
Court has held that such promises created a "duty of protection" on
the part of the federal government toward Indians that extends to federal statutes, agreements, and executive orders.93 The commitments
may be implied and the responsibility imposes an independent obligation on the federal government to remain loyal to the Indians to advance their interests-including the encouragement of tribal independence.94
The Supreme Court has held that the federal government is the
"fiduciary" of tribal resources.9 5 A Senate Commission expressed the
obligation as: ". . . to ensure the survival and welfare on Indian tribes
and people.., this includes an obligation to provide those services required to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and selfgovernment.. ."96 Generally, the trust responsibility extends to all reservation trust assets
97 including water and agency duties for water projmanagement.
ect
The federal government has not upheld its obligations to tribes in
the past. For example, when the Newlands Project, which serves the
Carson River watershed in Nevada, was originally planned, the United
States persuaded the Indians to exchange their 160-acre allotments
within the project area for 10-acre parcels which the United .States.
promised would receive water from the Newlands Project when it was
completed.9" This promise was broken, the allotments proved not to
be irrigable, and project water was not delivered to them.9 Congress
later promised to add land to the reservation and bring 1800 acres un-

least $4 million per year in terms of federal hydropower revenues downstream. Another measure of the value of relinquished water marketing authority is to consider
the value established by the ETSI proposal-$180 per acre foot per year, or $9 million
per year for 50,000 acre feet. Statement of Caleb Shields, supra note 88.
91. The Supreme Court recognized this trust responsibility in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
92. CherokeeNation, 30 U.S. at 27.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. American Policy Review Commission, Final Report, 130 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977).
96. Id.
97. The trust responsibility is imposed on the administrative agency entrusted with
the authority and responsibilities over Indian affairs. The Bureau of Indian Affairs is
responsible for management of federal irrigation projects, therefore, the BIA owes a
fiduciary duty to tribes to protect Winters rights.
98. Chambers and Echohawk, supra note 80, at 463.
99. Id. at 461.
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der cultivation, but this too was never accomplished.'
In the SanJuan
region, the Governor of New Mexico petitioned the Navajo Nation to
waive all their Winters rights in exchange for construction of NIIP, a
project that has never been built. Another example of delayed or broken promises is the Animas-LaPlata which was to provide for the settlement of the Colorado Ute Indian tribes' reserved water rights
claims.'0 ' These tribes have been waiting since 1988 for the AnimasLaPlata Reclamation Project to be built to fulfill promises made by the
government in that Compact,02 but the federal government is the only
remaining party to the agreement that has yet to fulfill its obligations
under the Compact.' 0 Without the construction of the project, the
tribe's alternative would be to reopen litigation, jeopardizing the water
rights of non-Indian irrigators and municipalities, including owners of
water on the La Plata and Animas rivers and their tributaries. 0 4 Failure
to complete the project would violate the government's trust responsibility to the tribes.
CONCLUSION
Tribes have the legal authority to assert their claim to an enormous
share of water in the West. Most Indians believe that water marketing
in water-short basins can benefit both Indians and non-Indians and
tribes have expressed their willingness to work cooperatively with states
to provide water to those willing to lease unused tribal water rights.
Through water marketing, tribes hope to become self-supporting, independent of most federal government services. Water marketing may
provide a last opportunity for tribes to maximize the value of a resource to assist Indians.

100. Id.
101. The Animas-LaPlata Project will deliver water committed by the federal government under the 1988 Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Act. The
agreement settled the Southern Ute and the Ute Mountain Ute Indian Tribes' Winters
water rights claims. The project has been delayed since its authorization in 1968 for
numerous reasons and is currently under attack by the Feingold "Green Scissors"
movement, see n.59.
102. The Southern Ute Tribe expects the United States to keep its work to the tribe.
Telephone Interview with Mr. Leonard Burch, retired Tribal Chairman, Southern Ute
Tribe (Feb. 5, 1997).
103. The construction of Animas-LaPlata is the only uncompleted component of
the settlement. The State of Colorado has already built the Towaoc pipeline which
delivers drinking water to the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation from the Dolores Project.
The State has also met its obligation to escrow funds-now sixty million-for the construction of ALP. Id.
104. Statement of Ron Pettigrew, President, and Steve Harris, Secretary, Board of
Directors Animas-LaPlata Water Conservancy District, supra note 55.

